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Introduction 
In 2019 the Hydrogen Group continued to de-
velop the in-house specialized CFD codes, 
GASFLOW and COM3D, and conducted sev-
eral experimental programs to deepen the un-
derstanding of the mixing behavior and the 
transient combustion phenomena, flame accel-
eration and deflagration-detonation-transition, 
of accidentally released hydrogen. Members of 
the group are actively transferring their insights 
and expertise into the respective IEA Hydro-
gen Task 37, the standards committees of ISO 
(TC 197), CEN/CENELEC (TC 6) and in the 
European Hydrogen Safety Panel. Among 
other third party funded projects the Hydrogen 
Group has been conducting ambitious experi-
mental programs for the European Fuel Cell 
and  Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH JU) 
funded projects PRESLHY - Pre-normative re-
search for the safe use of liquid hydrogen - and 
HyTunnel-CS - Pre-normative research for 
safety of hydrogen driven vehicles and 
transport through tunnels and similar confined 
spaces. The report for 2019 will focus on some 
highlights provided by the Hydrogen Group in 
the field of hydrogen safety in tunnels and con-
fined spaces. 
 
Hydrogen Fire Suppression in Traffic 
Tunnels 
The Hydrogen Group supported by the Pro-
Science team has performed more than 600 
tests to investigate the effect of mechanical 
ventilation on hydrogen jet structure and dis-
persion. The experiment was integrated in the 
huge test vessel V220, see Figure 1a,b. A pow-
erful fan was installed in one of the two main 
ports of the vessel. Between the ports a 6 m 
long test domain was arranged to mimic a 
scaled down cut-out of a tunnel with an acci-
dental release of hydrogen. Thirty different 
configurations were examined by changing the 
H2 mass flow rate from 1 to 5 g/s and the air 
flow velocity in the range 1.5- 5 m/s with co-
aligned, opposite and tranversal direction of 




Figure 1: a Experimental set-up of tunnel ventilation ex-




Figure 1: b View from downstream on the ventilated tun-
nel segment with central fan 
 
The aim of the experimental campaign was to 
determine the hazard distances as function of 
hydrogen mass flow rate, ventilation air flow 
velocity and relative release direction. It was 
found that for all examined configurations, the 
mechanical ventilation led to a considerable 
size reduction of the pre-mixed cloud defined 
by the flammable mixture.  
Relevant tests have been selected for upload-
ing of the corresponding result files on the Hy-
Tunnel-CS open data repository. These data 
will be further used for code validations. 
 
Hydrogen Fire Suppression in Traffic 
Tunnels 
Fires are representing typical hazards in tun-
nels and some devastating fire accidents 
where initiating the development of the Euro-
pean tunnel safety directive [https://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0054&f
rom=en]. As hydrogen fires show some quite 
distinct characteristics and different behavior 
compared to conventional fires and the current 
version of the European tunnel safety directive 
does not address hydrogen as an alternative 
fuel, the applicability of conventional mitigation 
technology has to be evaluated. The suppres-
sion effects of installed fire safety systems and 
the special accidental conditions have been 
                              
 
(a)                                           (b)                                              (c) 
Figure 2: Measured concentrations in horizontal plane at height of release nozzle; (a) without ventilation, (b) with 
counterflow ventilation (c) with co-flow ventilation 
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studied experimentally and theoretically by nu-
merical simulations.  
The CFD code Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
[https://www.nist.gov/services-resources/soft-
ware/fds-and-smokeview], developed by the 
US NIST and widely used in the fire safety 
community, has been adopted to analyze the 
hydrogen fire generated from an accidental re-
lease of hydrogen. The simulations account for 
the effects of water sprays and/or in oxygen 
starving conditions. The main variations con-
cern the leaking mass flow rates of the hydro-
gen source, the mass flow rates of water injec-
tion, and /or different droplet sizes. 
Figure 3 shows the simplified 3D tunnel section 
which is modeled geometrically together with 
three cars. One of the cars releases its high 
pressure hydrogen inventory via a nozzle on 
the lower rear side, as a primary fire is as-
sumed to open the temperature activated pres-
sure release device (TPRD). The release noz-
zle pointing backwards from the concerned 
car, is marked with red color in Figure 3. 
 
(a) Longitudial view 
 
(b) Transverse view 
Figure 3: Numerical mesh of the simulated road tunnel 
segment with 3 cars,  
one of them (on the right hand side) releasing hydrogen 
through a nozzle (red dot) 
 
The gas temperature and gas compositions 
have been computed with and without water 
spray and with a variation of oxygen depletion 
in the concerned tunnel segment, i.e., less 
than 21 vol. % in normal air. The simulation 
cases are put together into the following table. 
The transient thermal state of the gas in the 
control volumes, e.g., temperature and steam 
fraction, have been calculated. The results are 
used to derive recommendations whether the 
environment in the tunnel is suitable for fire 
control, evacuation and rescue operations un-
der the heat release rates of the hydrogen fire 
and for the selected water spray and oxygen 
depletion conditions. 
The following preliminary results are obtained 
by the FDS simulations. The temperatures of 
as shown in Figure 4 indicate a cooling effect 
of the water spray on the fire, although the tem-
perature decrease is not that much due to the 
relatively low mass flow rate of water in that 
simulation case. It is interesting that for some 
cases the gas temperature with spray is higher 
than without spray (compare black and blue 
line in Figure 4). The reason for this surprising 
behavior is, that the hydrogen combustion is 
intensified by the turbulence and mixing effect 
induced by the spray droplet momentum. 

































 X-Z+ (Small mdot of water with small droplet) 
 X-Z+ (Small mdot of water with large droplet)
 X-Z+ (Large mdot of water with small droplet)
 X-Z+ (Without spray)
 
Figure 4: Gas temperature changes in upstream caused 
by water spray 
 
The humidity (steam fraction) is also computed 
as it is a classical indicator for the impact on 
human beings. Obviously, the humidity at tun-
nel exit is increased due to the operation of wa-
ter spray. It means that some droplets must 
evaporate and remove tangible heat of hydro-
gen fire. However, although this might have an 
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impact on first responders strategies, there is 
practically no effect of the increased humidity 
on the reaction kinetics. Another observation 
is, that a higher water spray mass flux does not 
further improve the situation. 
So, it may be concluded that up to a certain 
limit a larger mass flow rate of spray brings bet-
ter cooling effect and produces a higher steam 
fraction in the gas mixture. In certain conditions 
the spray may increase turbulence levels and 
promote faster combustion. The simulations 
with high degree of oxygen depletion show that 
even under extreme conditions hydrogen is al-
ways burnt almost completely and no flamma-
ble mixture is leaving the simulation domain. 
So a transfer of unburnt hydrogen into another 
segment or into the ventilation ducts is very un-
likely. 
 
Consequence analysis of hydrogen 
explosions in tunnels 
In the more unlikely case of late ignition of re-
leased and pre-mixed hydrogen in the tunnel, 
fire phenomena become less relevant and mit-
igation of the potential explosion effects be-
comes more important. Without proper mitiga-
tion, the blast waves generated in a local 
hydrogen combustion event might travel a 
much longer distance in the tube like tunnel 
structures than in a free environment. To pro-
vide a reference scenario a typical tunnel acci-
dent with late ignition was analysed with the in-
house code GASFLOW-MPI [1]. This refer-
ence scenario consisted of a tunnel segment 
with two parallel lanes in the same direction 
(two separate tubes), with a very mild inclina-
tion, but without ventilation or spray activation, 
i.e. without accounting for any active mitigation 
technology. 
 
Figure 5: Tunnel segment modeled for late ignition / 
explosion scenario 
 
It was assumed that the inventory of 5 kg 
stored at one hydrogen driven car under high 
pressure is released via the TPRD at the rear 
of the car, similar as for the fire simulations 
above. For the release phase GASFLOW-MPI 
determines the time dependent mass of hydro-
gen included in the flammable cloud and the 
potential for a deflagration-to-detonation tran-
sition (DDT) in this premixed system (see Fig-
Table 1.1: Calculation cases of hydrogen fires suppressed by water sprays or oxygen depletions 
 Water spray Oxygen depletion 
Small mass flow rate 
of water 

























































ure 6 top). This information was used to deter-
mine the most conservative location and timing 
for an ignition. So ignition was assumed for 
maximum flammable mass at about 12.5 s af-
ter start of the release in a central position of 
the premixed cloud with a hydrogen concentra-
tion close to stoichiometry (about 30%). The ig-
nition location close to the central ceiling may-
be easily motivated, as in tunnels with such a 
horse-shoe shaped cross-section the electric 
supply lines for light and ventilation are instal-
led typically there. However, an accidental ig-
nition by a spark is considered a weak ignition 
source, as it won’t initiate a detonation directly. 
After the weak ignition GASFLOW-MPI deter-
mines the transient pressure loads generated 
in the deflagration. Although a DDT may not be 
ruled out, because of the high degree of con-
finement and obstruction, it is difficult to deter-
mine the exact location and further develop-
ments of a detonation. However, the loads 
generated by the deflagration, with local max-
ima in the order of 3 bar (see Figure 7), are 
strong enough to damage all involved vehicles 
seriously and eventually to destroy the tunnel 
structure. 
 



























a) Hydrogen integral mass and λ criterion in the area 
Figure 6: a): time evolution of flammable mass and 
relative diameter of DDT capable cloud; 
 
b) Y-z-cut of hydrogen concentration and the location 
of ignition 
Figure 6: b) vertical cut of flammable cloud at critical 




Figure 7: Blast wave caused by hydrogen deflagration 
reaches the car roofs 
 
It has to be stressed, that this scenario is as-
sumed to have very low probability. It is mainly 
used as a reference for evaluating the effec-
tiveness of mitigation measures against explo-
sion scenarios. The next chapter describes 
such an evaluation for water sprays, which are 
typically installed in larger tunnels. 
 
Study of attenuation effect of water 
droplets on blast waves 
To gain a better understanding, first the differ-
ent attenuation mechanisms, like momentum 
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absorption, thermal absorption, reflection and 
droplet breakup, were systematically assessed 
with simplified analytical models. Influencing 
parameters, such as droplet size and liquid 
phase concentration were analysed. A litera-
ture survey provided an overview of similar re-
search and allowed to identify high quality val-
idation data generated in well instrumented 
experiments. 
A suitable droplet model, addressing the main 
phenomena droplet drag forces and droplet 
breakup, has been developed and imple-
mented in the COM3D code. The correlations 
and parameters needed for the drag coefficient 
and for the breakup time and secondary drop-
let size have been tuned to reproduce the re-
sults published in [A. Chauvin et al. “Investiga-
tion of the attenuation of a shock wave passing 
through a water spray”. In: International Sym-
posium on Military Aspects of Blast and Shock 
(MABS) 21 (2010]. Figure 8 depicts the chan-
nel used in these experiments with the high 
pressure driver region, a low pressure blast 
wave travel zone and the droplet cloud zone.  
The results achieved with the COM3D imple-
mented model are compared to the experi-
mental results in Figure 9. The simulations re-
produce the results qualitatively and quanti-
tatively reasonably well. In particular the early 




Figure 8: Experimental set-up for the Chauvin experi-
ments 
Subsequently, using the developed model, 
simulations have been conducted to plan mid-
dle sized water spray / shock wave interaction 
experiments in the hydrogen test facility V220 
of the hydrogen test center HYKA. Hydrogen is 
detonated in a combustion unit, what induces 
a shockwave. The pressure propagation in the 
absence and presence of a droplet cloud has 
been computed. The results will be used to 
tune the experimental layout. 
Finally, it is planned to use the COM3D code 
with these new extensions to assess the miti-
gating effects of conventional water sprays and 
modern mist system for hydrogen explosion 











Figure 9: Comparison of COM3D results and measured pressure at point 3190 without (red lines) and with droplet 
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